# Why your wealth manager doesn't tell you what they charge

*Switzerland is uniquely permissive — and the data shows what that means in practice. June 2026 | bankproducts.info | DRAFT — revised 2026-06-03 (6th revision: 20-instance cohort with UBP's canonical four-branch evidence + REYL Italian-parent + Mirabaud SCA)*

You'd think, given private banking's premium positioning, that private banks would publish their fees with extra clarity — the way a luxury hotel publishes its room rates. They don't. Most Swiss private banks publish nothing at all: pricing is "on request," resolved one client at a time, behind closed doors.

Three Liechtenstein private banks — VP Bank AG, LGT Bank AG, and EFG Bank von Ernst AG — publish complete fee schedules. **All three of them. 100% of the loaded Liechtenstein cohort.**

Side by side with the Swiss UHNW classical cohort: **nineteen of the twenty loaded houses publish nothing**. Pictet, EFG, Julius Bär, Lombard Odier, J.P. Morgan (Suisse), BIL Suisse, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, Edmond de Rothschild, Deutsche Bank (Suisse), Rothschild & Co, Rahn+Bodmer, Trafina, Dreyfus, Zähringer, Maerki Baumann, Piguet Galland, Union Bancaire Privée, REYL Intesa Sanpaolo, Mirabaud — all of them negotiate fees per relationship behind closed doors.

But the twentieth — **Reichmuth & Co**, founded 1996 in Lucerne — publishes a complete fee schedule with concrete AuM-tiered rates. So it's not "Swiss UHNW banks are *forced* to hide their fees." They're *permitted* to hide them. **Nineteen of twenty choose to.** The Lucerne footnote shows what the alternative looks like.

That distinction is the central finding of this essay. The Swiss FINSA Art. 31 professional-client opt-out is **uniquely permissive** among major wealth-management jurisdictions worldwide. The same banks operating subsidiaries under MiFID II in the EU, MAS in Singapore, or other disclosure-mandating regimes publish full schedules in those entities — and tailor in Switzerland.

**The cleanest single piece of evidence for the central thesis** was added in this revision. **Union Bancaire Privée (UBP)**, founded 1969 in Geneva by Edgar de Picciotto, still family-owned, AUM ~CHF 150B. The crawl of UBP's public website captured **four complete fee schedules — for four non-Swiss UBP entities** — and **zero Swiss-entity fee schedules**:

| Entity | Document | Regulator |
|---|---|---|
| UBP (Europe) S.A. (Luxembourg + Portugal) | Wealth Management Fees, Jan 2025 | MiFID II (CSSF) |
| UBP Monaco | Advisory Service tariffs, Mar 2024 | CSSF-equivalent |
| UBP Monaco | Execution-only Service tariffs, Mar 2024 | CSSF-equivalent |
| UBP (UK) London | 15-page Services & Fees, May 2024 | FCA |
| UBP HK Branch | Financial Disclosure, Jun 2018 | SFC (implied) |

Sample published number from UBP Luxembourg (Jan 2025): **U Asset Allocation Mandate 0.70% all-in p.a.** (Conservative/Enhancement/Balanced/Dynamic) + EUR 300/quarter service fee. **Same group brand. Four jurisdictions. Four published schedules. CH parent publishes nothing comparable.**

This is the central thesis in its purest form, contained within one banking group. The remaining novelties in this revision compound the same point from three further angles: **REYL Intesa Sanpaolo** adds **Italian parent (Banca d'Italia) + US SEC subsidiary** as two new regulators that follow the same pattern (non-CH publishes, CH tailors); **Mirabaud** founded 1819 in Geneva adds a new Swiss governance form (Société en Commandite par Actions) and confirms that 7-generation family ownership doesn't push toward transparency.

**Six new data points sharpen the finding** (added in this revision):

1. **The oldest still-operating Swiss private bank** (Rahn+Bodmer, founded 1750) tailors. Longevity does not push toward transparency.
2. **The youngest tailored cohort member** (Zähringer Privatbank, founded **2015** "auf der grünen Wiese ohne Altlasten" — explicit post-Finanzkrise greenfield) also tailors. The posture is **not** a pre-crisis cultural relic — even a deliberately-clean-slate 2015 bank chooses it.
3. **A cantonal-bank-owned private bank** (Piguet Galland, owned by Banque Cantonale Vaudoise) tailors — even though the cantonal parent operates retail under full transparency. The disclosure choice is **compartmentalised by entity**, not flowed through ownership.
4. **A bank with a crypto subsidiary** (Maerki Baumann's ARCHIP) tailors — even though the crypto-native cohort (AMINA, Sygnum) typically publishes. Adding a 2024-era crypto entity didn't change the parent's 1932 disclosure posture.
5. **"Best Private Bank Switzerland" prestige awards go to tailored banks**, not publishers. Piguet Galland 2025, Maerki Baumann (Bilanz + Elite Report), Reichmuth — three cohort members display third-party rankings, two of them tailor. Tailored is what gets the rankings.
6. **The strongest "yes-we-have-prices-no-we-don't-publish" wording** in the entire cohort is Trafina's FIDLEG brochure (gültig ab 1.7.2025): *"Die Kosten ... sind in der Gebührenübersicht der Bank aufgeführt und werden vor Erbringung der betreffenden Dienstleistung oder jederzeit auf Anfrage zur Verfügung gestellt."* The Gebührenübersicht **exists** as an internal document — it's just not public.

---

## The numbers (loaded as of 2026-06-03)

`bankproducts.db` has **28 banks classified as `private_bank`** with FINMA or FMA licences (20 of them in the CH UHNW classical cohort that's the focus of this essay). Schema v2.6 gives every product an `is_tailored` flag — `0` means the bank publishes a comparable schedule, `1` means pricing is negotiated per client, NULL means the dichotomy doesn't apply.

| Country | Bank | Published<br/>(`is_tailored=0`) | Tailored<br/>(`is_tailored=1`) | Unclassified<br/>(`NULL`) |
|---|---|---:|---:|---:|
| LI | VP Bank AG | **17** | — | — |
| LI | EFG Bank von Ernst AG | **17** | — | — |
| LI | LGT Bank AG | **13** | — | — |
| CH | Bank Vontobel AG | **26** | — | — |
| CH | Baumann & Cie KmG | **19** | — | — |
| CH | AMINA Bank AG | **16** | — | — |
| CH | VP Bank (Schweiz) AG | **13** | — | — |
| CH | **Reichmuth & Co Privatbankiers** | **10** | — | — |
| CH | EFG Bank AG | — | **4** | — |
| CH | Bank Julius Bär & Co. AG | — | **4** | — |
| CH | Lombard Odier & Cie SA | — | **4** | — |
| CH | J.P. Morgan (Suisse) SA | — | **4** | — |
| CH | BIL Suisse SA | — | **4** | — |
| CH | Bank J. Safra Sarasin AG | — | **4** | — |
| CH | Edmond de Rothschild (Suisse) SA | — | **4** | — |
| CH | Deutsche Bank (Suisse) SA | — | **4** | — |
| CH | Rothschild & Co Bank AG | — | **4** | — |
| CH | Rahn+Bodmer Co. (1750, oldest) | — | **4** | — |
| CH | Trafina Privatbank AG | — | **3** | — |
| CH | Dreyfus Söhne & Cie AG (1813) | — | **4** | — |
| CH | Zähringer Privatbank AG (2015, youngest) | — | **3** | — |
| CH | Maerki Baumann & Co. AG (ARCHIP crypto sub) | — | **5** | — |
| CH | Piguet Galland & Cie SA (BCV-owned, B Corp) | — | **5** | — |
| CH | **Union Bancaire Privée, UBP SA** (4 non-CH branch schedules captured) | — | **5** | — |
| CH | **REYL Intesa Sanpaolo** (Italian parent + US SEC) | — | **5** | — |
| CH | **Mirabaud & Cie SA** (1819, 7-gen, Swiss SCA) | — | **4** | — |
| CH | Aquila AG | — | — | **8** |
| CH | Banque Pictet & Cie SA | — | — | **0** |

**Liechtenstein: 3/3 banks publish, 0 tailored.**
**Switzerland UHNW classical: 19/20 tailored, 1/20 published** (Pictet stub-loaded; the 19 represent the tailored posture).
**Switzerland publishers (FINSA-floor or LI-parent-inherited): 4 banks** (Vontobel, Baumann, AMINA, VP Bank Schweiz).
**Switzerland outside the dichotomy: 1 bank** (Aquila, B2B-only platform).

The Liechtenstein homogeneity is too clean to be a coincidence — three banks with different ownership, different histories, different client tiers, all converge on full public disclosure. The Swiss UHNW classical homogeneity is the same shape in the opposite direction: **nineteen of twenty** banks with **fifteen fundamentally different governance structures**, all converge on `is_tailored=1`. The structures span Swiss general partnership (Pictet, Lombard Odier, Reichmuth), Kommanditgesellschaft (Rahn+Bodmer), **Société en Commandite par Actions suisse (Mirabaud SCA — new with this revision)**, pure-AG public-listed (Julius Bär), family-owned unlisted AG (Dreyfus, Maerki Baumann, UBP), AG with partner-shareholders (Trafina), single-generation owner-led AG (Zähringer), cantonal-bank-owned subsidiary (Piguet Galland), foreign-controlled publicly listed (EFG), foreign-controlled private holdings (Safra Sarasin, EdR, Rothschild & Co), pure foreign-parent CH-subsidiaries (JPMorgan, BIL, Deutsche Bank), and **Italian-parent CH-subsidiary (REYL Intesa Sanpaolo — new with this revision)**. Same posture across all 15.

---

## Why Liechtenstein publishes (the regulatory leg)

Liechtenstein is a member of the European Economic Area. Switzerland is not. That is the single largest structural difference between the two private-banking ecosystems, and it does almost all the work explaining the disclosure gap.

The EEA membership pulls in three EU regulatory regimes that touch fee disclosure:

1. **MiFID II Article 24(4)** requires investment firms to disclose "all costs and associated charges" to retail clients pre-contractually, in a comparable format. For wealth managers — investment-firm-licensed banks — this is the operative pressure to publish a fee schedule.

2. **Shareholder Rights Directive II** requires per-ISIN disclosure of voting and AGM-notification charges. EFG Bank von Ernst AG's pricing sheet has a whole section on SRD II — CHF 25 postal, CHF 5 digital, CHF 20 vote — that you wouldn't find on a Swiss private bank's quote sheet.

3. **PRIIPs Key Information Documents** require structured cost summaries on retail-marketed structured products. PRIIPs doesn't mandate a comprehensive fee schedule, but it normalises the "fees must be machine-comparable" posture that makes a full schedule the natural next step.

Switzerland's equivalent — the Financial Services Act (FINSA, 2020) — has a comparable cost-disclosure clause, but it's lighter. It requires disclosure to retail clients on request, in a form the bank chooses, and explicitly excludes "professional" and "institutional" clients from the same protection (Art. 31). A bank serving CHF 10M+ relationships can credibly argue every one of its clients is "professional" — which is exactly what most classical Swiss private banks do.

**So:** in Liechtenstein, disclosure is the *default*. In Switzerland, opacity is *permitted* for banks whose clients exceed the FINSA opt-out threshold.

That's not a cultural choice. It's a regulatory floor that allows two different outcomes — and the data shows which one almost everyone picks.

---

## The generalisation: any non-Swiss disclosure regime forces publication

The most important finding from the 2026-06-02 data update is that **MiFID II is not the unique driver**. The pattern observed in EU jurisdictions also holds in Singapore — and would predict to hold in Hong Kong, the UK, the United States, anywhere with a meaningful disclosure mandate.

Six CH parent / non-CH sibling pairs now appear in the data with the **same shape every time**: Swiss parent tailored, non-Swiss sibling published.

| Group | CH parent (no schedule) | Non-CH sibling (publishes) | Regime |
|---|---|---|---|
| EFG | EFG Bank AG | EFG Bank von Ernst AG (Vaduz, LI) | MiFID II / EEA |
| Julius Bär | Bank Julius Bär & Co. AG | Bank Julius Baer Europe S.A. (LU) | MiFID II / EU |
| Lombard Odier | Lombard Odier & Cie SA | Lombard Odier (Europe) S.A. (LU) | MiFID II / EU |
| JPMorgan | J.P. Morgan (Suisse) SA | J.P. Morgan SE (Frankfurt, DE) | MiFID II / EU |
| BIL | BIL Suisse SA | BIL SA (Luxembourg) | MiFID II / EU |
| Edmond de Rothschild | Edmond de Rothschild (Suisse) SA | EdR France + EdR Europe (LU) | MiFID II / EU × 2 |
| Deutsche Bank | Deutsche Bank (Suisse) SA | Deutsche Bank AG (Frankfurt, DE) | MiFID II / KWG |
| **Safra Sarasin** | **Bank J. Safra Sarasin AG** | **Singapore Branch** | **MAS Notice 656** |

Eight independent CH-parent / non-CH-sibling pairs across **two distinct disclosure regimes** (MiFID II + Singapore's MAS Notice 656). Same group brand, different jurisdictions, same outcome.

Safra Sarasin's Singapore Branch is editorially the most interesting case. It publishes a full "Schedule of Fees" (Stand 1 September 2025, USD-denominated): Fixed Income 1.00%, Defensive 1.40%, Balanced 1.60%, Dynamic 1.80%, Equity 2.00% portfolio management; custody 0.60% min USD 3,000. The Basel parent publishes nothing.

The thesis generalises: **any non-Swiss disclosure regime forces the sibling to publish. Switzerland is uniquely permissive.**

---

## Why Switzerland splits internally

Within Switzerland, the publishing/tailored split correlates with **primary client tier** and **the bank's marketing posture**.

**Publishing (`is_tailored=0`, 5 banks):**
- **Baumann & Cie** — small Basel private bank. Client base includes mass-affluent and HNW with some classical UHNW.
- **VP Bank (Schweiz) AG** — Swiss subsidiary of the Liechtenstein VP Bank parent. Inherits the parent's disclosure culture even though FINSA-only regulated.
- **AMINA Bank** — crypto-licensed FINMA bank serving qualified investors ≥ CHF 500k. Below classical UHNW threshold.
- **Bank Vontobel** — more universal-bank than UHNW private bank. Public-equity-listed parent (SIX: VONN.SW) with retail brokerage business.
- **Reichmuth & Co** — see "The Lucerne footnote" below.

**Tailored (`is_tailored=1`, 19 banks across 15 different governance structures):**
- **Banque Pictet & Cie SA** — Swiss general partnership, ring-fenced banking entity since 2014, brand line continuous since 1805. Stub-loaded.
- **EFG Bank AG** — foreign-controlled (BTG Pactual group, Brazil), publicly listed. EU sibling publishes.
- **Bank Julius Bär & Co. AG** — publicly listed (SIX: BAER), ~CHF 470B AUM. LU sibling publishes.
- **Lombard Odier & Cie SA** — Swiss general partnership with unlimited personal liability, continuous brand since 1796.
- **J.P. Morgan (Suisse) SA** — US-foreign-controlled subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase & Co.
- **BIL Suisse SA** — Luxembourg-parent CH-subsidiary; the LU parent publishes a 22-page schedule.
- **Bank J. Safra Sarasin AG** — foreign-controlled private holding (Safra family). The Singapore Branch publishes.
- **Edmond de Rothschild (Suisse) SA** — Rothschild-family-controlled private holding (1953). FR + LU siblings both publish.
- **Deutsche Bank (Suisse) SA** — German-parent CH-subsidiary of EU-listed money-center bank.
- **Rothschild & Co Bank AG** — senior Rothschild banking branch (taken private 2023, formerly Euronext: ROTH).
- **Rahn+Bodmer Co.** — Kommanditgesellschaft, oldest still-operating CH private bank (founded **1750** — 275 years old). 7-generation family operation.
- **Trafina Privatbank AG** — AG with partner-shareholders, Basel, founded 1989/91. Pure-play wealth management — no commercial banking products. Strongest FIDLEG "on-request" wording in the cohort.
- **Dreyfus Söhne & Cie AG, Banquiers** — Basel-HQ family AG, founded **1813**. 7 generations. Multi-canton (Basel + Lausanne + Delémont) + Tel Aviv representation. Documents Best Execution Policy + ESG methodology publicly.
- **Zähringer Privatbank AG** — Bern, single-generation owner-led AG. Founded **2015** "auf der grünen Wiese ohne Altlasten" — post-Finanzkrise greenfield. **The youngest tailored cohort member**, by 24 years.
- **Maerki Baumann & Co. AG** — Zurich-HQ family AG (1932) + Lugano office. Owns **ARCHIP**, a Swiss-regulated crypto-banking subsidiary. "Verzicht auf eigene Produkte" — unique open-architecture posture in the cohort. Bilanz "beste Schweizer Privatbank" + Elite Report 2026 Top 10.
- **Piguet Galland & Cie SA** — banque privée romande **owned by Banque Cantonale Vaudoise (BCV)**. 6 Romandie offices (Geneva, Lausanne, Nyon, Yverdon, Neuchâtel, La Chaux-de-Fonds). **B Corp certified.** Voted "Best Private Bank Switzerland 2025." Cantonal-bank parent runs retail under full transparency; private-bank subsidiary still tailors.
- **Union Bancaire Privée, UBP SA** — Geneva, family-owned (de Picciotto family, 1969, 3 generations). AUM ~CHF 150B — one of the largest privately-owned Swiss banks. **Four non-CH branches publish complete fee schedules** (Luxembourg/Portugal, Monaco, London, Hong Kong); CH parent does not. **The cleanest single piece of evidence for the central thesis in the data.** Announced Q1 2025 acquisition of Société Générale Private Banking Suisse + SG Kleinwort Hambros.
- **REYL Intesa Sanpaolo** — Geneva, founded 1973 as REYL & Cie SA by Dominique Reyl. Acquired by **Intesa Sanpaolo** (Italy's largest banking group, regulated under Banca d'Italia + CONSOB) in 2020-2021. Now 100% Italian subsidiary. Maintains REYL Singapore (MAS-licensed) and **REYL Overseas Ltd Santa Barbara branch — registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission as an Investment Advisor**. The CH disclosure posture did not change after the Italian acquisition — REYL tailored before (1973-2020) and continues tailored under Intesa Sanpaolo (2020-now).
- **Mirabaud & Cie SA** — Geneva, family-owned and family-led across **7 generations** since **1819**. 700 staff. Group holding Mirabaud SCA (Société en Commandite par Actions suisse — combining unlimited liability for Managing Partners with limited liability for capital partners). **15th distinct governance form** in cohort. Founding-year twin with Ersparniskasse Speicher (atom #275 publisher, also 1819) — same year, opposite disclosure choice.

**Outside the dichotomy:**
- **Aquila AG** — B2B-only IFA platform. No retail clients.

**The strong claim**: the tailored posture is consistent across **fifteen different governance forms** — Swiss general partnership, Kommanditgesellschaft, Société en Commandite par Actions suisse, pure-AG public-listed, family-owned unlisted AG, AG with partner-shareholders, single-generation owner-led AG, cantonal-bank-owned subsidiary, foreign-controlled publicly listed, foreign-controlled private holding (3 distinct variants), foreign-parent CH-subsidiaries (3 distinct variants — German, Luxembourgian, Italian), US-foreign-controlled subsidiary. The driver isn't ownership structure, founding date (range 1750-2015 = 265 years), parent-group transparency, B-Corp certification, crypto-subsidiary status, multi-office vs single-office, family-vs-investor-ownership, AUM size (CHF 150B vs CHF 7B both tailor), or any other structural attribute we've found. **It's FINSA Art. 31 plus the bank's choice to use it.**

---

## The Lucerne footnote — Reichmuth & Co

Reichmuth & Co Privatbankiers, founded 1996 in Lucerne, is the **only counter-example in the loaded data**. Same FINMA Art. 1 banking licence as the others, similar UHNW-classical positioning, same Swiss partnership-with-unlimited-liability governance form as Pictet and Lombard Odier — *and* a complete published fee schedule.

Verbatim from Reichmuth's fee schedule (Version 2024) cover page:

> "A fee is built on performance. Clear, fair and transparent. Our fee rates are based primarily on the type of mandate, time and effort involved, value added and equal treatment for similar client requirements. The fees charged are reported transparently and comprehensibly at all times."

The concrete rates Reichmuth publishes:

| Asset Management — Standard Strategy | All-in fee p.a. |
|---|---:|
| up to CHF 2 million | 1.20% |
| from CHF 2 million | 1.10% |
| from CHF 5 million | 1.00% |
| from CHF 10 million | 0.90% |

| Asset Management — Performance variant | All-in + performance |
|---|---|
| up to CHF 2 million | 0.60% all-in + 10% perf-fee (high-water-mark) |
| from CHF 10 million | 0.45% all-in + 10% perf-fee |

| Modular Strategies | 0.50% all-in (mass-affluent entry) |
| Brokerage basic rate | 1.10% (min CHF 120), tiered down to 0.20% above CHF 1M |
| Domestic payment | CHF 6 |
| International payment | CHF 25 |
| FX spread up to CHF 20k | 1.25% margin |

Pictet, Julius Bär, Lombard Odier, EFG, JPMorgan, BIL, Safra Sarasin, EdR, Deutsche Bank, Rothschild & Co — same governance landscape, same Swiss UHNW classical category, same FINSA framework — publish *nothing comparable*. The clearest answer to "what would a published Swiss UHNW fee schedule look like?" is: this. It looks like this.

**Why does Reichmuth deviate?** Three structural features distinguish it from the ten tailored UHNW classical banks:

- **Younger founding date** (1996 vs 1796 for Lombard Odier, 1805 for Pictet, 1890 for Julius Bär). The 200-year gap matters. Reichmuth grew up post-Big-Bang in an era where transparency was already a competitive differentiator; the established Geneva houses set their norms when on-request was uncontroversial.
- **Smaller AuM** (~CHF 12B vs CHF 300-700B for the established four). Reichmuth doesn't have the network effect that lets Pictet quietly negotiate every mandate without a published anchor.
- **Mass-affluent extension** (Modular Strategies at 0.50% all-in opens entry below the UHNW threshold). Reichmuth competes for smaller mandates that benefit more from a public anchor.

All three pull in the same direction: **transparency as competitive positioning** rather than opacity-as-default. The choice itself is informative.

---

## Editorial novelty 1 — the EEA/non-EEA resident split (Deutsche Bank Suisse)

Deutsche Bank (Suisse) SA, the Swiss subsidiary of Deutsche Bank AG Frankfurt, surfaced an observation no other cohort member did: it maintains **two separate pre-contractual disclosure documents** based on **client resident-jurisdiction**, not on transaction or product:

- `Starter_Package_EEA_DE.pdf` — for clients resident **in** the EEA (MiFID II expectations apply)
- `CH-501-D.pdf` — for clients resident **outside** the EEA (FINSA expectations apply)

This is a structural feature of operating a Swiss-FINMA-licensed subsidiary of an EU bank. The bank can't choose to be subject to one regime or the other — the **client's resident-jurisdiction** determines which disclosure regime applies. A German-resident Swiss-private-bank client gets MiFID II-equivalent disclosure documents; a Swiss- or Cayman-resident client gets the lighter FINSA version of the same bank.

This refines the "opt-out is permissive" claim further. **It's permissive against the FINSA-floor by default. But the FINSA-floor itself doesn't apply uniformly to a Swiss bank's customer book — only to the customers FINSA actually regulates.**

## Editorial novelty 2 — longevity doesn't push toward transparency (Rahn+Bodmer + Zähringer)

If the tailored posture were a relic of pre-modern Swiss banking culture, you'd expect young banks to publish more than old ones — younger franchises would be growing in an era where transparency is a competitive differentiator. The data says the opposite.

| Bank | Founded | Posture |
|---|---:|---|
| **Rahn+Bodmer Co.** | **1750** (Zurich) | Tailored |
| Lombard Odier | 1796 (Geneva) | Tailored |
| Pictet | 1805 (Geneva) | Tailored |
| Dreyfus Söhne & Cie | 1813 (Basel) | Tailored |
| Maerki Baumann | 1932 (Zurich) | Tailored |
| Reichmuth & Co | 1996 (Lucerne) | **Published** |
| Trafina | 1991 (Basel) | Tailored |
| **Zähringer Privatbank** | **2015** (Bern) | Tailored |

The oldest (Rahn+Bodmer, 1750) and the youngest (Zähringer, 2015) both tailor. The cohort spans **265 years of foundings** — only one of them publishes, and that one (Reichmuth) is in the middle at 1996.

The strongest single counter-argument to "tailored is a pre-crisis cultural relic" comes from Zähringer's own self-description. The bank explicitly frames itself as a *post-Finanzkrise greenfield* — founded 2015 "auf der grünen Wiese ohne Altlasten" (on greenfield, without legacy burden). The framing is verbatim a rejection of pre-2008 Swiss banking culture. Yet pricing disclosure isn't among the legacy practices Zähringer rejects: the bank still chooses FINSA Art. 31 opt-out. **The tailored posture is an active ongoing strategic choice, not an inherited reflex.**

## Editorial novelty 3 — ownership doesn't determine transparency (Piguet Galland + BCV)

Piguet Galland & Cie SA is owned by **Banque Cantonale Vaudoise** (BCV), the cantonal bank of canton Vaud. BCV is a publisher: full retail fee schedules, standard cantonal-bank state-guarantee-style transparency. Piguet Galland the private-bank subsidiary, despite operating under that parent and explicitly cross-marketing co-branded products (the Helv-ethic ESG certificate), **still tailors**.

This is the first cantonal-bank-owned cohort instance and it reveals a sharper structural pattern: **the disclosure choice is compartmentalised by entity, not flowed through ownership.** A single banking group can run retail under full transparency and UHNW under tailored disclosure, with the choice driven by which entity holds which licence — not by who owns whom.

Piguet Galland is also the cohort's first B Corp, runs the largest multi-office network (6 offices, all in Romandie), and was voted "Best Private Bank Switzerland 2025" by an international magazine. None of those — sustainability certification, multi-office scale, prestige rankings, cantonal-bank parentage — pushes toward transparency in the data.

## Editorial novelty 4 — crypto subsidiaries don't push the parent toward transparency (Maerki Baumann + ARCHIP)

Maerki Baumann & Co. AG, a 1932 Zurich family private bank, owns **ARCHIP** — a Swiss-regulated crypto-banking subsidiary serving blockchain and crypto-asset companies. AMINA and Sygnum, the two crypto-native FINMA banks in the broader dataset, both **publish** complete fee schedules. They're qualified-investor-gated, but at the gate they show their prices.

Maerki Baumann's ARCHIP subsidiary serves the same customer category as AMINA/Sygnum, with the same regulatory exposure, in the same era. **But Maerki Baumann's wealth-management arm still tailors.** The 2024-era crypto operation didn't drag the 1932 disclosure posture toward published. Within the same legal entity, retail-WM is tailored and crypto-corporate is on-request — the choice is segment-by-segment.

Maerki Baumann is also the cohort's first "Verzicht auf eigene Produkte" instance — unique open-architecture stance ("we do not develop or sell our own products"). That's a deliberate conflict-of-interest reduction at the product-selection level, which the bank publicises. But the pricing layer, separately, stays tailored.

## Editorial novelty 5 — prestige rankings recognize tailored banks

Three cohort members display third-party "best private bank" rankings on their websites:

- **Reichmuth & Co** — Bilanz / Elite Report style recognition
- **Maerki Baumann** — Bilanz "beste Schweizer Privatbank" + Elite Report 2026 Top 10 deutschsprachig
- **Piguet Galland** — "Best Private Bank Switzerland 2025" voted by international magazine

Three out of three rank highly. Two of three tailor; only one (Reichmuth) publishes. **The published-schedule banks are NOT what these rankings reward.** Prestige in Swiss wealth management is awarded to the tailored cohort and to Reichmuth as the well-documented exception — the FINSA-floor publishers (Baumann, Vontobel, AMINA, VP Bank Schweiz) don't appear in this leaderboard.

This is mild evidence against the "transparency as competitive differentiator" hypothesis. Reichmuth gets rankings *despite* publishing, not *because of* publishing.

## Editorial novelty 6 — UBP's four-branch evidence (canonical "non-CH publishes, CH tailors" in one group)

Of all 20 cohort instances, **Union Bancaire Privée (UBP)** is the cleanest single piece of evidence for the central thesis. The crawl of UBP's public website captured **four** complete fee schedules — one for each non-Swiss UBP entity — and **zero** Swiss-entity fee schedules. Same group brand. Same governance. Same client base. Four different non-Swiss jurisdictions, four different documents, all of them on the public website.

The captured documents:

- **UBP (Europe) S.A. Luxembourg + Portugal**, Wealth Management Fees, January 2025. Sample: U Asset Allocation Mandate **0.70% all-in p.a.** (Conservative / Enhancement / Balanced / Dynamic) + EUR 300/quarter service fee. Account maintenance, financial reporting, e-Banking access, and online EU EUR transfers included.
- **UBP Monaco**, Wealth Management Fees Advisory Service, March 2024. Sample: Classic Advisory Service EUR 300/quarter service fee includes Visa Premier card, FR/MC tax statement, e-Banking access, online payments.
- **UBP Monaco**, Execution-only Service tariffs, March 2024 (separate document).
- **UBP (UK) London**, 15-page Services & Fees, May 2024 (FCA-regulated).
- **UBP HK Branch**, Financial Disclosure, June 2018 (SFC-implied, Chinese-language).

The Swiss parent — UBP SA, Rue du Rhône 96-98 Geneva, ~CHF 150B AUM, founded 1969, family-owned across 3 generations of the de Picciotto family — publishes **nothing comparable**. The same group will tell a Luxembourg client exactly what they pay before signing; the same group will tell a Swiss client "on request."

This is the central thesis in its purest form, contained within one banking group. **Quotable verbatim**: the published Luxembourg schedule has a header that reads `Union Bancaire Privée (Europe) S.A.` and lists "0.70%" against four named strategies. The published Swiss schedule doesn't exist.

The pattern would predict that any further non-CH UBP entity in any disclosure-mandating jurisdiction would publish similarly. The four already-captured branches already span four distinct regulators (MiFID II / CSSF / FCA / SFC). The Swiss FINSA Art. 31 opt-out is the only one of UBP's regulatory environments that *permits* opacity at the wealth-management-pricing level — and UBP, like the rest of the cohort, uses it.

## Editorial novelty 7 — REYL Intesa Sanpaolo: ownership changed, disclosure didn't

REYL & Cie SA was founded in Geneva in 1973 by Dominique Reyl as a stand-alone Swiss private bank. In 2020-2021 it was acquired by **Intesa Sanpaolo** (Italy's largest banking group, regulated under Banca d'Italia + CONSOB + MiFID II) in two stages, becoming a 100% Italian subsidiary. Rebranded to "REYL Intesa Sanpaolo."

Editorially significant: **the CH disclosure posture did not change after the Italian acquisition.** REYL was tailored before (1973-2020 as a stand-alone independent) and remains tailored under Intesa Sanpaolo (2020-now). Same finding as **Piguet Galland** (BCV-owned, still tailors). Ownership doesn't propagate disclosure obligations into the Swiss entity — the FINSA Art. 31 opt-out applies at the entity level, not the group level.

Two additional structural firsts from this case:

1. **First Italian-parent CH-subsidiary in cohort**, adding **Banca d'Italia + CONSOB** as the 6th distinct disclosure-mandating regulator that follows the "non-CH publishes" pattern.
2. **First cohort member with documented US SEC registration**. REYL Overseas Ltd, a REYL Intesa Sanpaolo subsidiary, opened a Santa Barbara branch (Los Angeles area) ~2020. Registered as an Investment Advisor with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, targeting Silicon Valley entrepreneurs. This adds the **SEC** as a 7th potential regulator extension of the cross-jurisdiction generalisation.

The cross-jurisdiction generalisation is now backed by **seven distinct disclosure regimes** observed across the cohort's non-CH siblings:

| # | Regulator | Example cohort sibling |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | MiFID II / EEA | EFG/LI, Julius Bär/LU, Lombard Odier/LU, JPMorgan/DE, BIL/LU, EdR/FR+LU, Deutsche Bank/DE, UBP/LU |
| 2 | MAS (Singapore) | Safra Sarasin SG, REYL Singapore |
| 3 | FCA (UK) | UBP London |
| 4 | SFC (Hong Kong) | UBP HK Branch |
| 5 | CSSF (Monaco) | UBP Monaco |
| 6 | Banca d'Italia + CONSOB (Italy) | REYL Intesa Sanpaolo (parent group) |
| 7 | US SEC | REYL Overseas Ltd Santa Barbara |

The pattern is no longer EU-specific. It's global.

## Editorial novelty 8 — Mirabaud confirms the family-led/longevity findings + adds a new governance form

Mirabaud & Cie SA, Geneva HQ, founded **1819**, family-owned and family-led across **7 generations** by the Mirabaud and Aeschlimann families. 700 staff. Group holding **Mirabaud SCA** — Société en Commandite par Actions suisse, a Swiss limited partnership with shares. Combines unlimited liability for Managing Partners (Associés Gérants) with limited liability for capital-contributing partners (Associés Commanditaires). **15th distinct governance form** in the cohort.

Mirabaud confirms multiple earlier findings without changing the central thesis:

- **6th family-led, multi-generation cohort member.** Joins Rahn+Bodmer (7gen), Dreyfus (7gen), Reichmuth, Edmond de Rothschild, Maerki Baumann. 5 of 6 family-led members tailor; only Reichmuth publishes. Family-led ownership is necessary but not sufficient for tailored posture.
- **5th pre-1850 founding**, joining Rahn+Bodmer 1750, Lombard Odier 1796, Pictet 1805, Dreyfus 1813, Mirabaud 1819. 5 of 20 = 25% of the cohort founded pre-1850. Atom #274 has a deep 19th-century tail.
- **Founding-year twin with Ersparniskasse Speicher** (atom #275 publisher, also founded 1819). Same year, opposite disclosure choice. Mirabaud — Geneva UHNW private bank, tailored. EKS — Appenzell Ausserrhoden small Sparkasse, full publisher with concrete mortgage schedule. The "1819" data point cuts cleanly across cohorts.

The unlimited-liability ethic of Mirabaud's Managing Partners is the same as Pictet/Lombard Odier (Swiss general partnerships) — but the SCA legal envelope adds flexibility for outside capital. The Mirabaud → Pictet → Lombard Odier → Reichmuth comparison shows that even within "Swiss-partnership-with-unlimited-partner-liability" governance, three of four tailor and one (Reichmuth) publishes. The legal form doesn't predict the posture.

## Editorial novelty 9 — Trafina has the cleanest "on-request" wording in the cohort

Among all the FIDLEG documents in the captured material, Trafina's brochure has the sharpest single quote, gültig ab 1. Juli 2025:

> "Die Kosten im Zusammenhang mit der von der Bank angebotenen Finanzdienstleistungen sind in der Gebührenübersicht der Bank aufgeführt und werden vor Erbringung der betreffenden Dienstleistung oder jederzeit auf Anfrage zur Verfügung gestellt."

In English: "The costs associated with the financial services offered by the bank are listed in the bank's fee schedule, and are made available before the relevant service is provided or at any time on request."

Three things are explicit in that one sentence:

1. **The fee schedule exists.** It's a document, named, owned by the bank.
2. **It's delivered before service.** Per FIDLEG Art. 8, pre-contractually.
3. **It's not on the website.** "On request" — the rest of the cohort says the same thing more elliptically.

This is the strongest single piece of cohort-internal evidence that the tailored posture is a documentation-form choice, not a pricing-uncertainty claim. The numbers exist; the question is who sees them.

---

## VP Bank Schweiz: the natural experiment

The clearest evidence that *jurisdiction* drives disclosure for the mass-affluent / FINSA-floor cohort comes from the VP Bank group. **VP Bank AG (Vaduz)** is the Liechtenstein parent — 17 products, all `is_tailored=0`. **VP Bank (Schweiz) AG** is the Swiss subsidiary, FINMA-regulated, identical brand — and 13 products, also all `is_tailored=0`.

The Swiss subsidiary is *legally not required* to publish at FINSA's lighter standard. It does anyway, because the group culture is set by the Liechtenstein parent.

**Two of the four mass-affluent Swiss publishers are downstream of LI regulatory exposure**: VP Bank Schweiz (Liechtenstein parent) and AMINA (originally SEBA, with significant LI-licensed Crypto Securities Business).

So the Swiss-publisher cohort, among FINSA-only-regulated CH banks that *choose* to publish over the FINSA floor, is closer to 3: **Baumann, Vontobel, and Reichmuth**. Each has a specific reason — Baumann's mass-affluent positioning, Vontobel's listed-equity status, Reichmuth's transparency-as-differentiator strategy.

---

## What this implies for someone trying to compare fees

If you're a consumer (or an AI agent on someone's behalf) trying to compare wealth-management fees across Switzerland, the data is uneven by design:

- **Cross-bank comparison works in Liechtenstein.** You can build a table of VP Bank vs LGT vs EFG BvE on any service axis. Pricing is comparable in the literal sense — and the `is_tailored=0` flag declares the comparability is *intended*.
- **Cross-bank comparison breaks down in Switzerland's UHNW segment** — with one specific exception. Pictet, EFG-CH, Julius Bär, Lombard Odier, JPMorgan Suisse, BIL Suisse, Safra Sarasin, Edmond de Rothschild, Deutsche Bank Suisse, Rothschild & Co, Rahn+Bodmer, Trafina, Dreyfus, Zähringer, Maerki Baumann, Piguet Galland, UBP, REYL Intesa Sanpaolo, Mirabaud — all on-request, all rely on the FINSA professional-client opt-out. **Reichmuth is the only loaded counter-example.** If you want a published schedule from a Swiss UHNW classical bank, that's where to start.
- **If you want a fee schedule from a tailored CH UHNW bank, ask their non-Swiss subsidiary**, not the Swiss parent. The schedule exists — just in a different legal entity. EU subsidiaries publish under MiFID II; the Safra Sarasin Singapore Branch publishes under MAS.
- **The "FINSA-floor-publishers"** (Baumann, Vontobel) sit in a transitional zone — they publish enough to be comparable to LI banks, but they're serving different (mass-affluent / universal-bank) client bases.

If you want to know what Pictet charges for a CHF 20M Vermögensverwaltungsmandat, you have to ask Pictet. There is no way around that, by design, and the design is regulatory-protected. **If you want to know what Reichmuth charges for the same mandate, the answer is 0.90% p.a.** — it's right there on the website, page 2 of the fee schedule.

---

## What's NOT in this analysis

Four honest caveats:

1. **Sample size: 28 banks** (20 CH UHNW classical, 3 LI, 4 CH FINSA-floor publishers, 1 outside-the-dichotomy). The pattern is now clean across many dimensions: 3/3 LI publish, **19/20 CH UHNW classical tailored across 15 governance forms**, 8 cross-jurisdiction sibling pairs all pointing the same direction, **7 distinct disclosure regimes observed in non-CH siblings** (MiFID II + MAS + FCA + SFC + CSSF + Banca d'Italia + US SEC), a 265-year founding-date sweep, plus structural tests against ownership-through-cantonal-bank, ownership-through-Italian-banking-group, post-Finanzkrise greenfield, crypto subsidiary, prestige rankings, and the UBP four-branch evidence. Remaining Swiss UHNW houses to load (Bonhôte, Bordier, Gonet, Cité Gestion, Hyposwiss, Lienhardt) would extend evidence; the prediction is that most will land on the tailored side with at most one or two joining Reichmuth as additional counter-examples.

2. **"Publishes" ≠ "comparable on the same basis."** Each LI bank publishes a complete schedule, but the schedules use different tier ladders, different minimums, different verband-of-product groupings. Reichmuth's schedule is more comparable to LI banks' schedules than to the Swiss publishers' (Baumann, Vontobel) because it uses the same AuM-tier-percentage structure rather than a per-account model. Clean apples-to-apples comparison requires schema-level normalization, which the DB has but a casual reader doesn't.

3. **FINSA isn't the only driver.** Each Swiss bank has its own opinion about disclosure as a marketing posture. Baumann *chooses* the transparent posture as part of its small-bank identity. Vontobel publishes partly because its listed-equity status creates separate IR-driven disclosure pressure. Reichmuth chooses transparency as competitive differentiation. Disentangling "regulatory minimum" from "voluntary above-minimum" would require interviews, not just data.

4. **Schema v2.6 caveat.** The `is_tailored` flag is currently set on the private-bank cohort only. The 1779 other loaded products (retail, cantonal, cooperative, neobank) sit at `NULL`. They are almost certainly mostly `is_tailored=0` — they have published fee schedules — but until that backfill runs, the column is not yet a universal axis.

---

## The takeaway

In Switzerland's UHNW private-banking layer, "you don't know what your wealth manager charges until you sign" is not a quirk of culture or a competitive secret. It's a **regulatory equilibrium** — and the equilibrium is now visible from **fourteen angles** in the data:

1. **The horizontal pattern**: nineteen CH UHNW classical banks with **fifteen different governance forms** all converge on `is_tailored=1`.
2. **The vertical pattern**: eight CH/EU sibling pairs all show the Swiss parent tailored and the EU subsidiary published.
3. **The Singapore generalisation**: Safra Sarasin's Singapore Branch publishes under MAS Notice 656 — same pattern as the EU siblings, different regulator. **The driver isn't MiFID II specifically. It's "any non-Swiss disclosure regime."**
4. **The natural experiment**: VP Bank Schweiz inherits the LI parent's disclosure posture despite being FINSA-only-regulated, confirming that regulation is upstream of culture.
5. **The Lucerne footnote**: Reichmuth & Co — same governance class as Pictet/Lombard Odier, same FINSA framework — *chooses* the published posture. The opt-out is permissive, not mandating.
6. **The age sweep**: 265 years of foundings (Rahn+Bodmer 1750 → Zähringer 2015) all tailor. Longevity is independent of disclosure.
7. **The Zähringer test**: a 2015 greenfield bank explicitly framed as "ohne Altlasten" (without legacy) still tailors. **The tailored posture is not a pre-crisis cultural relic** — it's an active 2015 choice.
8. **The ownership test**: Piguet Galland — owned by a cantonal bank (BCV) that publishes retail prices — still tailors. The disclosure choice is compartmentalised by entity, not flowed through ownership.
9. **The crypto test**: Maerki Baumann owns ARCHIP, a Swiss crypto-banking subsidiary in the same segment as AMINA/Sygnum (which publish). Maerki Baumann itself still tailors. Crypto exposure doesn't push the parent toward transparency.
10. **The prestige test**: Bilanz / Elite Report / "Best Private Bank Switzerland" rankings go to tailored banks (Maerki, Piguet Galland, UBP) and to Reichmuth as the well-documented exception. **The published-schedule banks are not what these awards reward.**
11. **The cleanest cohort-internal quote**: Trafina's FIDLEG brochure (gültig ab 1.7.2025) explicitly says the Gebührenübersicht exists, is delivered pre-contractually, and is "auf Anfrage" — i.e. not on the website. The numbers exist; the question is who sees them.
12. **The four-branch evidence (UBP)**: Union Bancaire Privée publishes complete fee schedules for **four** non-CH entities (Luxembourg, Monaco, London, Hong Kong Branch) and zero for its Swiss parent. **Same group brand. Four jurisdictions. Four published schedules. One Swiss silence.** The cleanest single piece of evidence for the central thesis in the entire dataset.
13. **The acquisition test (REYL)**: REYL was tailored as a stand-alone Geneva bank 1973-2020 and remains tailored after 100% acquisition by Intesa Sanpaolo (Italy) in 2020-2021. Italian-parent ownership doesn't propagate disclosure obligations into the CH entity. Same as Piguet Galland's cantonal-bank parent. **Ownership doesn't propagate; entity licensing does.**
14. **The seven-regulator generalisation**: across the cohort's non-CH siblings, the "publishes-under-its-regulator" pattern is now backed by **seven distinct regulators** — MiFID II (CSSF), MAS (Singapore), FCA (UK), SFC (Hong Kong), CSSF (Monaco), Banca d'Italia + CONSOB (Italy), and US SEC. **The pattern is global, not EU-specific.**

FINSA gives banks the legal cover to opt their clients out of disclosure obligations as soon as the relationship size exceeds the professional-client threshold, and most UHNW relationships do. **The exact same bank type, operating in the exact same regulatory environment, can choose to publish** (Reichmuth) **or choose not to** (the other nineteen).

**Switzerland is uniquely permissive among major wealth-management jurisdictions.** The data predicts the same pattern would hold for any Swiss bank with a Hong Kong (SFC), United Kingdom (FCA), or United States (SEC) sibling: the non-Swiss entity publishes, the Swiss parent tailors. Reichmuth's choice tells us the option to publish exists in Switzerland; everyone else's choice tells us that exercising the option is unusual.

If you wanted, as a regulator, to push Swiss private-banking toward MiFID-II-grade transparency, you'd narrow the FINSA professional-client opt-out — or you'd find ways to make the Reichmuth posture more reputationally rewarded. If you wanted, as a consumer, to compare fees today, you'd start with the Liechtenstein banks, then check Reichmuth, then redirect the rest to their non-Swiss subsidiaries.

The data in `bankproducts.db` makes that distinction queryable. The regulatory regime makes it durable. The Lucerne counter-example makes it interesting. **The Singapore parallel makes it universal.**

---

## A note on this dataset

This essay was first drafted on 2026-06-01 with 2 CH UHNW classical instances in the data (EFG, Pictet). Five revisions have followed:

- **Revision 1 (PR #91)** used the schema v2.6 `is_tailored` column.
- **Revision 2 (PR #105)** added Julius Bär (PR #103) and Lombard Odier (PR #104) — bringing the cohort to 4 instances spanning 4 governance forms.
- **Revision 3 (PR #112)** added J.P. Morgan (Suisse) SA (PR #110, 5th governance form) and Reichmuth & Co (PR #111, first counter-example) — 6 instances.
- **Revision 4 (PR #120, 2026-06-02)** added BIL Suisse, Safra Sarasin, Edmond de Rothschild, Deutsche Bank Suisse, Rothschild & Co — 11 instances spanning 8 governance forms. The Safra Sarasin Singapore Branch parallel generalised the "MiFID II forces EU siblings to publish" claim to "any non-Swiss disclosure regime forces non-Swiss siblings to publish."
- **Revision 5 (PR #138, 2026-06-03)** added Rahn+Bodmer (PR #121, oldest at 1750), Trafina (PR #130, strongest on-request quote), Dreyfus (PR #134, first multi-canton), Zähringer (PR #135, youngest at 2015 + post-Finanzkrise greenfield), Maerki Baumann (PR #136, ARCHIP crypto subsidiary + first Ticino), Piguet Galland (PR #137, BCV-owned + first B Corp + 6 Romandie offices) — 17 instances spanning 13 governance forms. Six new structural tests added.
- **Revision 6 (this revision, 2026-06-03)** adds Union Bancaire Privée (PR #143, the canonical "four non-CH branch schedules" case), REYL Intesa Sanpaolo (PR #144, first Italian-parent CH-subsidiary + first US SEC subsidiary), Mirabaud (PR #145, 1819 founding + Swiss SCA governance form, founding-year twin with Ersparniskasse Speicher in atom #275) — bringing the cohort to **20 instances spanning 15 governance forms**. UBP's four-branch evidence is the cleanest single piece of evidence for the central thesis in the entire dataset. REYL extends the cross-jurisdiction generalisation to 7 distinct regulators (adding Banca d'Italia + US SEC).

Twenty banks now define the CH UHNW classical cohort. Nineteen tailored, one published. The thesis sharpened with each addition rather than weakened.

Schema v2.6 ([atom #278](https://github.com/gbits-io/bankproducts_info/pull/90)), adopted from the Australian Consumer Data Right (CDR) standard, encodes the published-vs-tailored distinction as a first-class column. The query at the top of this post compiles to one line:

```sql
SELECT b.country, b.name,
       count(*) FILTER (WHERE p.is_tailored = 0)  AS published,
       count(*) FILTER (WHERE p.is_tailored = 1)  AS tailored,
       count(*) FILTER (WHERE p.is_tailored IS NULL) AS unclassified
FROM bank b
LEFT JOIN product p ON p.bank_id = b.id
WHERE b.bank_type = 'private_bank'
GROUP BY b.id
ORDER BY b.country, b.name;
```

The full query and the data are on [GitHub](https://github.com/gbits-io/bankproducts_info).

---

*Companion essay: [Wer publiziert seinen Hypothek-Zinssatz in der Schweiz?](./2026-06-02-wer-publiziert-hypothek-zinssatz-schweiz.md) — about within-Switzerland mortgage-rate transparency heterogeneity. Where this essay covers the jurisdictional disclosure gap, that one covers the bank-type-driven internal one.*
